THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION AND GREAT LAKES DIVERSIONS: INDIRECTLY EXTENDING THE REACH OF THE BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY
A. DAN TARLOCKt The 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty (Treaty)! is a model of international water resources cooperation because it provides a permanent dispute mechanism, the six member International Joint Commission (UC).
2 Thus, both Canada and the United States have much divert water outside the Great Lakes Basin. 8 Even small communities that straddle the divide between the Great Lakes and other drainages, which often includes a small part of a state, must meet a high standard to gain access to water located only a few miles away.
9 Similar antidiversion prohibitions exist in Canada. In 2002, for example, Canada enacted a strong federal anti-diversion law. 10 The Compact is a reaction to several proposed or possible projects to divert the Lakes' water to the more arid regions of the United States or undisclosed water-short countries. 11 In reality, the threatened plans or bulk transfers were .either economically or politically infeasible or involved trivial amounts of water.
12 Nonetheless, they touched raw political nerves in both countries. In the United States, Congress has the plenary power to allocate the Lakes, and the eight basin states worried that they would progressively lose political power as the country's population continued to tilt to the sun. 13 The possibility of Congressionally mandated transfers to bail out Phoenix or other areas helped spur approval of the Compact. 14 In Canada, nationalist Greens raised the specter of the loss of Canadian sovereignty over its abundant water resources, but even more dispassionate and knowledgeable experts argued that Canada had no surplus waters to bail out the United States' profligate use of its waters. 15 characterize the role that the Charter is playing and will play in stimulating and guiding the evolution of a regional water management framework").
8. Compact, supra note 7, § 4.8. 9. See generally Compact, supra note 7.
10. International Boundary Waters Treaty Act, R.S., Ch. 1-20 (2002) . 11. In the late 1970s, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers released a Congressionally mandated study on ways to recharge the depleted Ogallala Aquifer from adjacent areas.
See, e.g., PETER ANNIN, THE GREAT LAKES WATER WARS, 68.(2006) . The study did not include any proposal to construct a pipeline from Lake Superior to the High Plains, but it triggered regional fears that the water-short West would eventually ask Congress to bail it out with Great Lakes water. See generally id. The fears were reinforced by the 1982 Supreme Court decision, Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) , discussed, infra footnotes 62-71, which held that groundwater still in the ground was an article of commerce and thus subject to the Dormant Commerce Clause; see also ANNIN, supra, (discussing reactions to feared diversions and Sporhase); Great Lakes Legal Seminar: Diversion and Consumptive Use, 18 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1986) (providing a good snapshot of the diversion fears and range oflegal responses in the mid1980s).
12. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 194 (discussing one empty bulk freighter). 13. See, e.g., Communities Take Action to Protect Great Lakes, National Public Radio, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=90517072&-ft=1&f=1007 (last visited Apr. 6,2009). 14.Id. 15 . Two respected Canadian academics criticized the Annex 2001 process, which led to the Compact, as an abdication of the Canadian federal government's responsibility [Vol. 54:1671 This argument drew on the long frustration caused by the population and economic imbalance between the two countries and the long history of perceived subordination of Canadian interests to its major trading partner. 16 This Article does not address the merits of the Compact. Its focus is on the paradox that an international water management regime, which deals with the core of the Treaty and the use of the Great Lakes, was negotiated outside the regime. One might expect that the IJC would lead an investigation of the issue and recommend either amendments to the Treaty or parallel federal legislation in Canada and the United States. In fact, the Compact superimposed yet another new regulatory regime over the Treaty regime. 17 The only attempt to harmonize the two regimes is found in section 8.2, which was added toward the end of the process. 18 section 8.2 makes the Treaty regime superior and provides in part that [n] othing in this Compact is intended to infringe nor shall any term hereof be construed to infringe upon the treaty power of the United States of America, nor shall be construed to alter or amend any treaty or term thereof that has been or may hereafter be executed by the United States of America .... Nothing in this Compact is intended to affect nor shall be construed to affect the application of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 whose requirements continue to apply in addition to the requirements of this Compact. 19 There are good reasons for the bypass. First, there was no boundary waters dispute for the IJC to adjudicate. The diversion threats were just that, and remote as well. Ironically, at Canada's insistence, the IJC was given limited adjudicatory powers. 20 The Treaty only applies to diversions or obstructions that affect the natural level of the lakes.
21 In addition, the use of IJC to adjudicate environmental controversies has not because it "would leave the provinces with no control over diversions in the U. been met with success. 22 The IJC asserted the power to determine its jurisdiction absent a request to adjudicate or a reference from the two countries. 23 This heresy was quickly rejected and adjudication is no longer requested by the two governments.
24 Second, Articles II and III of the Treaty impose a high burden of proof on any assertion of IJC jurisdiction. 25 The victim country must prove either injury or a lowered lake level.26 Third, the status of Lake Michigan, which forms no part of the Canada-United States boundary,27 as a boundary water, remains unsettled.
28 Fourth, the longer a treaty stands, the harder it is to amend it. canada-water-disputes-appear-likely-to-keep-flowing-2007 canada-water-disputes-appear-likely-to-keep-flowing- -1 0-17.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2009 REFORM, 747, 754-57 (2007) .
27. Map of Lake Michigan, available at http://encarta.rnsn.com/map_70l513942/-michigan_lake.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2009 REv. 469 (1970) .
In short, the Treaty is not structured to deal with political rather than actual diversion problems.
The basin states thus decided to address the problem themselves in close cooperation with the provinces of Ontario and Quebec. They produced a domestic agreement which has two significant international law aspects and one domestic law aspect. The second interesting aspect is that the Compact adopts, with little fanfare, directly and indirectly several contested key principles of international environmental law such as precaution and the recognition that the Lakes are a common heritage of humankind. 37 Third, given the crucial national and international significance of the Great Lakes, it is striking that the United States federal government played almost no role in the Compact;38 it did not even send a federal representative to the Compact processes as it has done when an interstate compact is being negotiated to allocate a river in order to pave the way for federally subsidized dams. 39
The HC played an important role in the Compact process in two crucial ways. First, it addressed some of the difficult legal questions that provincial versus federal foreign affairs capacity nonetheless remains open in Canada because in addition to the long transition from being part of the British Empire to becoming an independent nation, the country has a strong federal system in which the provinces have considerable exclusive authority especially with respect to natural resources. See Email from Noah Hall, infra note 87. Provinces might refuse to comply with a non-Empire international treaty signed by the federal government if the treaty deals with water allocation, including the allocation for environmental values as the Compact does. Id. The three maritime provinces and the province of Canada (now divided into Ontario and Quebec) formed modem Canada in 1867. HOGG, supra at 254-56. The Constitution Act of 1867 gives the provinces exclusive authority to public land management and property, which is understood to include water. Constitution Act, supra, at section 92. Section 91 reserves to the federal government the residual power to legislate for "Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada," but the scope of this power as it relates to water has not been tested. Id. at section 91; see also P.H. PEARSE, F. POllCY 61-84 (1985) (discussing the precarious balance between federal and provincial authority over water allocation and management).
35. HOGG, supra note 34, at 254-56. 36. The "myth" has its roots in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., which held that three nineteenth century public lands statutes severed water from the public domain and gave the states exclusive authority to choose a legal system to allocate western waters. 295 U. S. 142, 154-55 (1935 were hindering the negotiations. Second, the IJC helped make a sciencebased case for the anti-diversion regime in face of arguments that "locking up" the Lakes was economically irrational, unnecessary and that a conventional division of the waters among the states would be a superior response. 40 This Article advances the modest thesis that the IJC's role is a case study in how international treaty organizations can overcome the limitations that are inherent in a body controlled by a limited number of sovereigns. International bodies which are willing to take the risk of taking a strong stand on an issue can help international environmental norms to evolve through their incorporation into domestic legal regimes and can adapt these regimes to changed circumstances not contemplated in the treaty.
II. BARRIERS TO THE NEGOTIATION OF THE COMPACT
To understand the niche that the IJC found to influence the Compact process, it is necessary to understand the barriers that threatened to block any agreement. The Compact faced two sets of barriers. The first were the conventional disincentives that often prevent interstate cooperation in sharing a contested water resource. The second were a set of legal and scientific issues that were unique to the Great Lakes. On the plus side, most of the present uses of the lake are non-consumptive. It is easier to agree on the balance among non-consumptive as opposed to consumptive uses.
Since the 1920s, interstate compacts have been hailed as the best way to share interstate resources, but water compacts are hard to negotiate. 42 The riparian states must either be convinced that an allocation regime is superior to the status quo or that at least some of them cannot maintain the status quo in face of proposed uses by other states. 43 prevent fast-growing southern California from claiming the whole flow of the river under the doctrine of prior appropriation. 44 Often states balk because a compact will make them worse off because they must decrease their water use. For example, this fear has blocked the negotiation of an allocation of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Tallapoosa watershed among Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. 45 Georgia argued that its upstream position had the most to lose from any agreement that requires minimum flows downstream for navigation enhancement and aquatic ecosystem protection. 46
The situation in the Great Lakes was different. Because serious diversions are hypothetical, the problem of dividing a limited resource among competing interests did not exist.47 Since the value of the Compact was primarily symbolic,48 .each state stood to gain politically by blocking future moves by "others" outside the region. Instead of the usual problems, the Great Lakes states faced three somewhat unique barriers, one political and scientific and the other two legal.
A. Thin Political and Scientific Justification
The first problem was that the Compact appeared geopolitically, constitutionally and hydrologically unfair, inefficient, irrational, and unnecessary. Quite simply, the goal of the basin states and provinces was to lock up twenty percent of the world's fresh water supplies almost exclusively for non-consumptive uses. 49 The numbers get worse because the Great Lakes account for ninety-five percent of the United States' surface supplies50 but only ten percent of the population lives in the basin. 51 Given the shift of population to the more arid areas of the country,52 one can legitimately ask: what is the rationale for this action, especially since all the diversion threats were and are, speculative at best and highly unlikely to come to fruition for environmental and economic reasons?53
During the negotiations two rationales to overcome these problems emerged, but they lacked a coherent scientific basis. First, the eight basin states argued that their political power would continue to decrease as the region fell behind most of the country in population growth. 54 Thus, it was a case of striking while the iron was hot, especially because there was no serious opposition in Congress or the rest of the country to the Compact.55
The second rationale came from Canada. Many Canadians were (and remain) deeply convinced that eventually "their" water would flow south and west. 56 In 2007, Dr. Frank Quinn, a leading Canadian expert on water policy, surveyed the shift in the United States to water conservation and demand management and the gap between the perceptions of the Canadian public and the historic tendency of the Canadian federal government not to rule all diversions off the table in the name of good relations with the "elephant" to the south.57 Admitting that there was no present or immediately foreseeable diversion proposal on the from simply taking a disproportionate share of waters along the international boundary, specifically ... the Great Lakes?,,58 This said, while assuaging Canadian angst may be laudable, it is not a complete rationale for putting the lakes off limits to the rest of the United States.
B. A Violation ofthe Judicial Common Market?
The lock-up strategy was not only scientifically and economically suspect, but it was a presumptive violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.59 The Compact solves this issue; a compact becomes federal law with Congressional approval and is an exercise of Congress' power to waive the Dormant Commerce Clause.
6o However, the issue was very alive during the 1980s and 1990s. State resource export bans have long been struck down on the theory that no state can hoard its resources to the detriment of other states. 61 A 1982 United States Supreme Court decision, Sporhase v. Nebraska,62 caused great concern on both sides of the border and cast a chill on the soft law regime that preceded the Compact and on its negotiation.
Sporhase was a farmer whose farm straddled the Colorado-Nebraska border.63 When Colorado's strict groundwater conservation regime blocked access to groundwater on the Colorado portion of his land, he proposed to pump the water from the Nebraska portion and~se it in Colorado. 64 In contrast to Colorado, Nebraska at the time followed a modified version of the common law on groundwater use, which gave overlying landowners the right to pump water with few restrictions. 65 61. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 596-98 (1923) (holding that although natural gas supplies in West Virginia were waning, the state was not entitled to favor its interests over those of other states, as the natural gas constituted a "lawful article of commerce").
62 CT. REv. 217 (1995) . Justices Scalia and Thomas believed that the doctrine had no basis in the Constitution and was an unjustified intrusion on state regulatory power. See id. at 233. Nonetheless, the Court has created only limited exceptions for environmental regulation. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (holding a ban on non-native "baitfish" is constitutional because the state demonstrated that the ban was necessary in light of uncertainty as to the effects of the possible presence of parasites and nonnative species having on the state's fisheries). However, the case opens up the possibility of a broader ecosystem protection defense.
73. I have addressed these and related issues in Tarlock, supra note 40. 74. If Sporhase were not enough, a prominent western water lawyer hired by the Great Lakes Governors caused a stir when he concluded that the Water Resource Development Act of 1986 (WRDA) was an unconstitutional delegation of power because it had no standard. ANNIN, supra note 11, at 198-202.
C. International Trade Law
In addition to the Dormant Commerce Clause, a second common market problem arose. "Canadian Nationalist Greens, among others, raised the argument that a Canadian export ban [which was ultimately adopted by the federal parliament], was illegal under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) because it discriminated against non-Canadians desiring to export water.,,75 A similar argument was made under NAFTA,76 These arguments were stoked by the Lockheed Report, which recommended that the best way to avoid all the constitutional problems with the Charter-WRDA regime was to enter into an interstate compact that gave each state a share of the lakes to use as it saw fit. This said, the IJC concluded, after considerable internal debate, that a state-provincial effort was the best avenue to protect the Lakes. 88 There was concern that if it did not, the United States federal government might instead preempt state efforts, as it had the full constitutional power to do, and the dedication of the lakes to regional uses might be subordinated to the possibility of national (arid) western use of the Lakes. 89 Pursuant to the reference, the IJC prepared a report, which examined both the scientific and legal issues raised by the diversion threats. 90 It marshaled available scientific research to underscore the need for a strong antidiversion regime.
See PETER LUKE, GREAT LAKES STATES CIRCLE THE WAGONS ON FRESH WATER (2006). This incredible anti-commodity argument was made in litigation challenging

A. A Rationale/or Leaving Twenty Percent a/the World's Fresh Water in Place
The Report blended a synthesis of the available science of the Lake's hydrology with the emerging,· and much contested, international environmental law precautionary principle in order to counsel that the Great Lakes states and Canadian provinces were a strong anti-diversion regime. 91 The foundation of this conclusion is the Report's mixed owner complained to a powerful, local Republican official, sufficient pressure was generated to fire him for the sin of disrespecting private property rights. Id. scientific economic classification of the lakes as a fragile, fully allocated "nonrenewable resource.,,92 This idea is a surprising and counterintuitive conclusion, given that the Great Lakes are currently used almost exclusively for non-consumptive uses.
93
Nonrenewable resources are usually deep aquifers and mineral deposits rather than rain fed water bodies. 94 Rivers and lakes are classic renewable resources and the conservation objectives and strategies are different. 95 With non-renewable resources, the issue is the optimum rate of mining. 96 With renewable water resources, the trick is balance consumptive uses with minimum flow demands constrained by estimates of average dependable supplies.
97 Nonetheless, the Lakes have a fundamental non-renewable characteristic, a long renewal time, that makes them analogous to a deep aquifer. 98 As the Report noted, less than one percent of the their total volume is renewed annually by precipitation and the levels remain relatively constant "with a normal fluctuation ranging from thirty to sixty cm (twelve-twenty-four inches) in a single year."99
The· line between a renewable and non-renewable resource is a matter ofjudgment, and the classification of the Lakes as fully allocated is a normative conclusion, which the Report was careful to underscore. 100 An allocation of a river or lake can refer either to a situation where recognized property rights exceed the available dependable supply or to the dedication of a resource to a suite of uses to the exclusion of others. The latter, which is the case in the Great Lakes, is an economic or normative choice rather than a hydrologically constrained situation. As the IJC recognized, an existing resource use mix can always be changed. IOI The observation that there would be opportunity costs just from any change in the status quo is not a compelling argument for the maintenance of the status quo. There were many suggestions that more consumptive uses should be allowed, because instead of costs there would be benefits from changing the status quO.
102 Those familiar with the law of prior appropriation in the Western United States suggested that the states enter into a compact which would make a conventional allocation among the riparian states so they could then use the water as they wished.
103 Some proposed a compact which would give each state a share. Others urged an allocation, but in a bow to the value of nonconsumptive uses recommended that it be constrained by a cap and trade program borrowed from the climate change debate. Thus, the Report had to take an additional step and provide a more convincing rationale for not incurring the opportunity costs of increased diversions and rejecting the lure ofprofitable interstate and international water markets.
The Report took this step by concluding that not only are the Lakes a non-renewable resource, but that they are a fragile one and thus change would involve risks. 104 This is another non-intuitive conclusion to anyone who has seen the Lakes on a stormy, windy day or remembers the concern about shoreline erosion and flooding in the mid-1980s.10 5
The basis of the fragility is the fact that lake levels fluctuate based on precipitation and evaporation cycles and even small seasonal fluctuations can have dramatic and costly consequences for the ecosystem and the maintenance of the primary commercial, non-consumptive use of the Lakes navigation. 106 Lake shippers, owners of pleasure boat launching facilities, and shore land property owners have lived with short and long term fluctuating levels for years.
lO ? For example, in the mid-1980s, the Lakes were high and the Be studied ways to increase the flow to the Saint Lawrence River. 108 However, since the mid 1980s, Lake levels have remained low; the current low period is perhaps the longest on record; although it is impossible to predict the incident and amplitude of future cycles. 109 Natural level cycles have been altered over time by human intervention, such as diversions. 110 Chicago's diversion to reserve the flow of the Chicago River is the largest. 111 The outflow from Lakes Superior and Ontario have been regulated by locks and dams, but only Lake Ontario's levels are significantly altered by the regulation.
ll2 Sand and gravel dredging have also affected lake levels. 113 However, compared to other large drainage systems, the Lakes are still a substantially unregulated system. 114 Still, the evidence shows that diversions and other forms of regulation and diversion have not had a significant impact on seasonable variations levels makes the case for controlling speculative, future diversions weak.
The case strengthens if the prospect of global climate change is factored into the mix. The Report concluded that the Lakes are "highly sensitive to climatic variability."ll5 It synthesized the various projected, but inconsistent, climate change scenarios to reach the bold conclusion that "[c]limate change suggests that some lowering of water levels is likely to occur . . . [and] the Commission believes that considerable caution should be exercised with respect to any factors potentially reducing water levels and outfloWS.,,116
The precautionary principle is an evolving international environmental law norm.
ll7 It can be stated in hard and soft: versions, 118
109. See Human Impacts on and Responses to Great Lakes Water Levels: Low Lake Levels, available at http://sitemaker.umich.edu/sec005group3/low_lake_levels (last visited Apr. 6, 2009 118. The soft precautionary principle posits that a high degree of certainty about the adverse impacts of an activity is not a necessary prerequisite to limit or regulate it and is but the core idea is that the state has the power to limit activities that pose a risk of future harm when the available scientific evidence about the likelihood and magnitude remains uncertain and inconclusive. 119 The United States has opposed the precautionary principle as a European import with the dangerous potential to undermine the more rigorous scientific foundations of United States environmental 1aws. 120 However, the principle has been endorsed by the World Trade Organization 121 and is increasingly applied.
The application of the principle to the Compact can be criticized because the probability and magnitude of the harm remain low, and the Compact chooses the crudest policy instrument, a total prohibition of the activity.122 However, the application can be defended because the opportunity costs of precaution are low. As long as the Lakes remain protected for non-consumptive uses, the exercise of precaution is a case of picking "the low hanging fruit." More broadly, the Compact is an important example of adoption of precaution in an international agreement. Oct. 10,2006) . The Panel decision rejected the EU's formulation which would have allowed any doubt, regardless of the scientific foundation, to justify a regulatory action, in this case a ban on GMOs. The EU argued that certain GMOs present potential threats to human health and the environment. It submitted that the existence of a potential threat justified the assessment of risks on a case-by-case basis and special measures of protection based on the precautionary principle.
122. Sunstein suggests that the principle should be used when the magnitude of the hann is great and that prohibition should never be considered the only appropriate policy instrument. Sunstein, supra note 118, at 119-20 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54: 1671 B. International Trade Law One of the persistent issues running through the Compact negotiations and debates was the fear that any regulatory regime which allowed any diversions would be found to be a violation of either NAFTA or GATT. 123 The argument is both a series of hard, unresolved legal issues and political theater and continues to be raised. 124 Since the late 1990s, environmental NGOs, especially Canadian nationalist Greens, have claimed that either the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution or international trade law might preempt all state and provincial control of diversions. 125 The basic argument was that any regime that allowed regulated diversions was therefore a "commodification" of the Lakes and could then be challenged as a disguised discriminatory trade practice. 126 The argument makes three crucial, but doubtful, assumptions. First, it assumes that raw water is a "good" which triggers trade law. Second, it assumes that a nation-to-nation case would ever reach the WTO 119-120 (Nov. 6, 1998 ), reprinted in 38 LL.M. 121 (1999 [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle]. It also has a chapeau, which prohibits the application of exempted regulation in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. Invoking both defenses would not be easy. The close cooperation between the two nations provides a basis to argue that this is not the kind of decision that requires WTO policing. WTO jurisprudence has evolved from an effort to isolate protectionist regulation to one which is willing to find that the failure of a nation to fmd alternative, cooperative means to achieve the regulatory objective constitutes trade discrimination. SUNGJOON CHO, FREE GATT and NAFTA prohibit national discrimination against the importation of goods similar to those produced (and protected) nationally.128 Thus, there is a threshold question: does the activity in question involve a produced good? GATT Article ill allows environmental regulations which treat "foreign" goods differently from domestic ones to be challenged as illegal. A "victim" state can argue that such regulation is a disguised trade restriction, which confers an unjustified competitive advantage on domestic products at the expense of imported ones. National treatment is intended to curb blatant protectionism and performs the same function internationally as the Dormant Commerce Clause does domestically.
The threshold legal issue is whether water in its natural state is a product or good AND at what stage does the use of water become a good? Answers are only clear at either end of the cycle of water use. Raw water in its natural state in a lake or river has not entered the stream of commerce. 129 It remains subject to the control of the sovereign country constrained only by any transboundary sharing duties. Further, there is no principle of trade law that forces a nation to engage in trade. Trade law only requires equal treatment of nationals and foreigners once the decision to trade is made. At the other end, once water is incorporated into a product, such as bottled water, it becomes subject to trade law. The gray areas involve diversions, storage and management decisions. 130 In the run up to the Compact, the fate of the resource improvement standard illustrated the political force of this argument. The Lockheed Report recommended that the states apply a standard from section 404 of the Clean Water Act to the Lakes.
13l Section 404 regulates the dredging and filling of wetlands. 132 In 1989, the first Bush Administration adopted a "no net loss" standard. 133 To accommodate this ambitious goal with land development, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers can authorize the destruction of "natural" wetlands if compensating degraded ones are restored or artificial ones are developed. 134 Under most drafts of the Compact, a diversion would have been allowed if there was a compensating resource improvement in the basin. 135 Many environmental organizations were comfortable with the idea of allowing small diversions in return for significant wetland restoration or similar projects.
136 However, in the end, Canadian objections appear to have forced its remova1.
137 Allowing a diversion to be traded off against a restored aquatic ecosystem was characterized as commodification.
There is no definitive legal precedent to resolution of this issue, but the Report played a significant role in dampening the legal and political force of the trade law objections to the Compact. It helped to strengthen the resolve of the eight Basin states and two Canadian provinces to proceed with a management regime and not to be spooked by the trade law invalidation horror scenarios floating through the basin. The Report identified the key legal issue as whether water in its natural state is a product or good for purposes of trade law and concluded that raw water that has not yet entered the stream of commerce is not a product or good. This conclusion was, of course, purely advisory, and the IJC has no special competence to pronounce on international trade law. But, subsequent analyses have confirmed the IJC's conclusion. A leading international environmental law lawyer, Edith Brown-Weiss, subsequently offered a powerful argument to support the conclusion: it is essential to consider that water is different from other resources. It is a unique resource.... Thus, it would be prudent to adopt an approach of "anticipatory caution" to strike the appropriate balance between the need to conserve water resources and the need to ensure a level playing field in trade relationships. Anticipatory caution means that in the face of uncertainty about the future, a country should be able to exercise its full sovereignty to maintain its fresh water resources without having to convince the trade community of the legitimacy of its actions. 138
IV. CONCLUSION: A MOMENT IN TIME
This Article previously observed that the diversion reference was a moment in time. All the forces were in alignment for a successful outcome. The two section Secretaries saw eye-to-eye as to the vision and willingness to take political risks by taking a firm position on a contentious issue; the six commissioners were supportive and generally deferred to the staff. The two governments were in agreement, or at least the United States was indifferent so long as the Great Basin states supported it and there was no serious section opposition. Of course, the IJC Report was by no means responsible for the successful negotiation of the Compact. But, the negotiators were operating in uncharted waters and the threat of trade law challenges had to be taken seriously. The Report helped to provide a coherent scientific case for the first time and to "internationalize" the Compact by placing it in the context of emerging international law norms. These two contributions strengthened the legitimacy of a somewhat questionable enterprise. The result is a model of aquatic ecosystem protection, imperfect as it, which is being carefully studied around the world. And, the IJC's indirect role in this process is an example of how a treaty body can interpret its mandate broadly in light of the spirit of the treaty, and not just the inevitable narrower language of the instrument. 139 The 100th anniversary of the Boundary Water Treaty celebrates another moment in time but one which is still very much with us. The first decade of the twentieth century was the birth of modernism, and in areas from culture to political institutions we are still living in that (1900) (1901) (1902) (1903) (1904) (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) , our fIrst self-consciously modem president,141 led the scientifIc conservation movement. This movement was founded on using the best scientifIc and technical knowledge to manage natural resources to promote the public interest in their effIcient use. Our notions of effIciency have changed, but the IJC's role in the Compact honors the conservationist spirit of the Treaty as well as the principle ofbi-national equality.
